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Rapid Integration of CPS Security and Safety
Fredrik Asplund, John McDermid, Robert Oates, and Jonathan Roberts
Abstract—The security and safety of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS) often influence each other. Ensuring that this does not
have negative implications might require a large and rigorous
effort during the development of CPS. However, early in the life-
cycle, quick feedback can be valuable helping security and safety
engineers to understand how seemingly trivial design choices in
their domain may have unacceptable implications in the other.
We propose the Cyber Risk Assessment Framework (CRAF)
for this purpose. The CRAF is based on openly available and
widely used taxonomies from the safety and security domains,
and a unique mapping of where loss of data security may impact
aspects of data with safety implications. This paper represents the
first time these different elements have been brought together into
a single framework with an associated process. Through examples
from within our organisations we show how this framework can
be put to good use.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical Systems, Co-design, Embedded
Systems Security, Safety Critical Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
S
ECURITY and safety are broad concepts whose mutual
boundaries are, at times, difficult to define clearly. At the
root of this ambiguity is the fact that both concepts relate
to mitigating risk [1]. Usually, safety engineering emphasises
the accidental triggering of hazards (sources) leading to harm
inflicted on people (consequences), while security engineer-
ing emphasises the malicious nature of attacks from threats
(sources) leading to negative impacts on assets (consequences).
The relationship between safety and security comes from the
overlap between these perspectives, for instance when harm
is inflicted on people as part of an attack or as an accidental
side-effect of it. Understanding this relationship is important
when engineering Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), since CPS
allow interaction with physical processes through information
technology [2]. We designed the Cyber Risk Assessment
Framework (CRAF) to facilitate this understanding among
engineers using best practice methods. CRAF has been applied
by several groups of engineers to safety-critical systems in
the marine and defense domains, and has been subject to
independent review from both academic and industrial experts
[3], [4]. Below we provide two slightly obfuscated scenarios,
based on what users have indicated as interesting from their
application of CRAF. These scenarios serve to exemplify
the link between safety and security, and will also be used
to demonstrate how we propose to improve the ability of
contemporary engineering to handle this relationship.
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1) Security engineers identified unsecure access to a crit-
ical function on a marine vessel. The critical function
allowed users to put the vessel’s engines in a state
which improved their efficiency temporarily, but which
would degrade their reliability in the long run. The
unsecured access was not acceptable, since all critical
functions should be protected and monitored. The se-
curity engineers thus suggested that access would be
secured by having the system ask for a user name and a
password, subject to locking the user out of the system if
the wrong credentials were presented repeatedly. When
safety engineers analyzed the proposed design change
they realized that users would be asked for credentials
in highly stressful situations and that being unable to put
the engines in their high-efficiency state could jeopardize
the safety of the crew. To resolve the situation they
suggested that the room in which the system was located
would instead be secured with a physical lock, thereby
allowing access control at an earlier, less stressful time.
However, while this would protect the engines, it would
prevent establishing who triggered the mode change
after-the-fact. After reviewing the design suggested by
the safety engineers, the security engineers deemed the
risk associated with it acceptable.
2) Safety engineers identified how cabling could com-
promise the structural integrity of a fuel tank. They
suggested that integrity would be preserved by changing
the digital communication from wired to wireless. While
the design change was acceptable from the perspective
of the safety engineers, they acknowledged that it could
increase the risk of data leaking to others than the
intended recipients. This triggered an investigation by
security engineers into the implications of the change,
which eventually deemed the associated risk acceptable
due to the encryption employed.
The risk associated with hazards and threats can sometimes
be understood by using proven historical data to calculate
the probability of undesirable events. However, this is often
unrealistic when engineering complex CPS — accidents might
occur due to the unexpected aggregation of environmental
factors rather than their random combination, and the adver-
sarial nature of security means that attackers innovate, adapt
and deploy attacks not seen in historical data. There might
also, as in the aforementioned scenarios, be a lack of useful
historical data as the risk relates to hitherto unreleased design
changes. Therefore, qualitative assessment of security- and
safety-related risks fill an important role in best practice in
CPS engineering [5], [6]. Assessment in the two disciplines
need to be combined as the disciplines require two different
skill sets, and those able to analyse the one might not fully
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comprehend the other. In fact, a deep understanding of the
cyber part of security does not ensure an understanding of how
cyber threats extend out into the physical world. Qualitative
approaches can combine safety and security either through
unification or integration [7]. It has been suggested that uni-
fication is fundamentally flawed as it opens up the possibility
of compromising the techniques in either discipline [8], to
which must also be added the extra cost of training engineers
outside their field of expertise. While more promising, there
are a multitude of integration approaches, such as those
modifying the life-cycle [9], processes [10] or methods [11]
used. Especially in regard to methods there is a proliferation of
research output in support of parts of CPS engineering, such
as assurance [12], analysis [13] and architecture design [14].
The majority, if not all, of these approaches can be labelled
as costly and intrusive — they require both a significant
effort to introduce and a significant change to development
practices. They are also mostly comprehensive, i.e. aiming
to help engineers understand all the possible implications
of security on safety and vice versa. This implies that the
development of a CPS will have to have progressed quite
far for these methods to yield useful results. We do not aim
to disparage these methods — time will most likely see a
number of them becoming best practice in CPS engineering.
However, our experience shows that there is room for tech-
niques that instead serve to rapidly integrate CPS security
and safety, especially during early parts of the life-cycle. We
posit that quick, but guided, feedback to security and safety
engineers regarding decisions in each other’s discipline is just
as important as ensuring complete and correct handling of
all cross-disciplinary issues. This type of feedback allows
manufacturers to avoid costly rework later in the life-cycle,
especially when they are saddled with considerable legacy and
in domains where regulation makes it cumbersome to integrate
disciplines. Therefore, we developed CRAF to address this
gap as a light-weight scalable risk assessment framework for
CPS in civil and defence applications in the marine, nuclear,
avionics and rail domains.
This standpoint has been explored extensively within our
organisations in regard to factors influencing quality, such as
the uncertainty of requirements [15], [16]. From these studies
we know that software rework in our domain can cost up to
25 times the original cost of deploying functionality, even if
an issue is caught in a formal baseline. To thus quantify the
implications of CRAF using a recent run-of-the-mill project:
16% of the requirements were security-related, and 5% of
these were identified as having unexpected interactions with
safety. This suggests a 20% cost saving of using the CRAF
to increase the early interactions between security and safety
engineers. Even as an organisation learns from past omissions
these cost savings may stay substantial, as the complexity of
security in CPS is only expected to grow.
Comprehensive state-of-the-art methods aimed at the re-
quirements phase could possibly offer the same savings, but
at a larger upfront cost for each new project. However, one
should note that if best practice in the future comes to include
substantial amounts of formalized design [17], then other
approaches for the early integration of safety and security
Fig. 1. Linking Security to Safety
might yield better results than qualitative analysis [18].
II. THE CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The following subsections introduce the publically available
taxonomies underlying the CRAF and present the unique
mapping we have defined to close the gaps between them.
A. Bringing together Taxonomies
A Threat Source is a person or organisation that desires to
breach security and ultimately will benefit from the breach in
some way. There are taxonomies of threat sources, including
specific ones for industrial control systems [19] (see Table I).
A Threat Type is a type of attack [20] (see Table II). These
can be linked to the cyber part of security through the Data
Security Properties of information assets [21] (see Table III
with Integrity expanded as per the definition in the source).
Information assets can likewise be connected to Data Safety
Properties [22] (see Table III). Vulnerabilities are inadequacies
of an organisation’s assets, ranging from its policies to physical
hardware [19] (see Table IV), that can be exploited by a threat
source.
Although it has been suggested that safety requirements
should always be prioritized before security requirements [23],
allowing safety responses to compromise security can motivate
attackers to jeopardise safety to achieve their goals. Therefore
the relationship should be treated as bi-directional. Barring
case-specific consequences, there are terminologies available
for all identified important concepts. This allows us to model
the link between security and safety engineering as shown in
Figure 1, using inspiration from older modelling efforts [24].
Aligning the referenced taxonomies along this link constitutes
the first novel contribution of the paper.
B. Bridging the Gap to Consequences
To bridge the remaining gap between security and safety
we link the data security properties to data safety properties
(see Table III). This mapping is based on how the loss of
data security can lead to an impact on aspects of data which
may have safety implications. Developed largely by expert
judgment, informed by involvement in [22], this mapping
constitutes the second novel contribution of the paper.
In our evaluation of the CRAF we have used HAZOP guide-
words made available for linking the data safety properties to
hazards related to the physical part of CPS [22]. Presumably
other methods found in the academic literature for establishing
the impact of security on safety could have been used instead.
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TABLE I
THREAT SOURCES [19]
Threat Source Subtypes
Individual Outsider, Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Group Ad hoc, Established
Organisation Competitor, Supplier, Partner, Customer
Nation State
TABLE II
THREAT TYPE [20]
Threat Types (STRIDE)
S : Spoofing Identity
T : Tampering with Data
R : Repudiation
I : Information Disclosure
D : Denial of Service
E : Elevation of Privilege
TABLE III
DATA SECURITY TO SAFETY MAPPING [21], [22]
Data Security
Property
Data Safety Properties
Confidentiality Accessibility, Disposability/Deletability, Intended
Destination/Usage, Suppression, Traceability
Integrity Accuracy, Completeness, Consistency,
Fidelity/Representation, Format, History, Integrity,
Resolution, Sequencing
Availability Accessibility, Availability, Lifetime, Priority, Se-
quencing, Timeliness
Non-repudiation History, Integrity, Traceability, Verifiability
Authorisation /
Authentication
Accessibility, Disposability/Deletability, Integrity,
Intended Destination/Usage, Lifetime, Suppression
TABLE IV
VULNERABILITY GROUPS [19]
Vulnerability Groups
Policy and Procedure Physical
Architecture and Design Software Development
Configuration and Maintenace Communication and Network
III. USING THE CRAF
To enable engineers to use the CRAF for rapid integration of
security and safety we leverage on exisiting technical risk as-
sessments: best practice in security engineering already scope
the security problem and link threat sources to information
assets, while on the safety side, engineers identify hazards
and link these to the cyber parts of the CPS. Early in the
engineering life-cycle, especially when building on legacy, this
will result in data available to both sides for quick checks of
whether seemingly trivial design decision in one discipline
have unacceptable implications according to the other. In the
following subsections we use the aforementioned scenarios to
exemplify the three steps required to use the CRAF for this
purpose.
A. Communicating a Decision
The first three columns in Table V and Table VI provide the
initial written communication between engineers in Scenarios
1 and 2, respectively. In the first column the identified risk is
described. In the the second column the decision advocated by
the discipline raising the issue is detailed. The third column
notes the affected data properties as found through the use of
the CRAF.
B. Raising a Conflict
The fourth column in Table V and Table VI provides the
response from the other engineering discipline, where the
guidance of the CRAF has led them to identify a conflict.
C. Conflict Resolution
In the fifth column in Table V and Table VI we outline
the conflict resolution required to solve Scenarios 1 and 2.
Eventually the decision in Scenario 1 came down to one of
three alternatives, which are described in Table VII. This is
obviously a simplification of the required conflict resolution
process given that CPS can be highly complex. However, it
serves to show that the CRAF is not meant to be a blind
application of guide-words to identify issues that needs to be
dealt with. It is meant to highlight decisions and help engineers
start thinking in the right direction. Identified issues might
require more analysis (as shown in Table V), or a simple
acceptance of the decision (as shown in Table VI). Indeed,
depending on the application decisions might require complex
trade-offs between safety and security.
D. Limitations
The CRAF maps the relationship between safety and se-
curity using the implications of how a loss of data security
can impact aspects of data that may have safety implications.
It is possible that a more appropriate mapping from safety to
security can be identified using other logic. Further research
is required to validate the value of the current mapping in
both directions, and possibly to identify more useful alternative
mappings.
Our risk assessment framework is designed for CPS, which
have a cyber component to them. As the above examples
indicate, this support extends out into the physical world.
However, the vaguer the connection to the cyber part, the more
difficult it is to make the connection between disciplines early
on. Indeed, our framework might not even be a suitable support
if the connection between disciplines is purely in regard to the
physical part of a CPS. Further research is required to establish
how the CRAF can be modified to overcome this issue.
The Data Safety Properties we used are from a non-
exhaustive list [22]. Thus valuable properties for bridging the
gaps between the disciplines may still be unidentified.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this letter we propose the Cyber Risk Assessment
Framework (CRAF) to support decision-making by enhancing
early communication between security and safety engineering
during the development of CPS. The framework is constructed
based on openly available and widely used taxonomies from
the safety and security domains. Through examples from
within our organisations we show how the framework can be
put to good use. Future work will be aimed at providing a
publically accessible evaluation of the framework, improving
it in regard to issues solely related to the physical parts of
CPS, and validating its mapping between safety and security.
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TABLE V
USING THE CRAF FOR SCENARIO 1
Output, Security
Risk Assessment
Decision, Security
Engineering
Data Security
Property
Data Safety Property: Conflict Conflict Resolution
Identification of
unsecured access
to [Function X],
a critical function
which should be
protected and
monitored.
Access to [Function
X] will from now
on be protected by
credentials.
Authentication Integrity (Difficult to set data to
its true state): Putting the engines
in their high-efficiency state is re-
quired to protect the safety of the
crew. Requiring credentials to be
presented in what could be a stress-
ful situation might thus lead to fa-
talities.
1. Suggestion to secure the room in which the system
is located with a physical lock, thereby allowing
access control at an earlier, less stressful time.
2. Security risk assessment identifies that this so-
lution does not allow access to [Function X] to be
logged.
3. Alternative 3 was chosen as the best acceptable
solution using Table VII.
TABLE VI
USING THE CRAF FOR SCENARIO 2
Output, Safety
Risk Assessment
Decision, Safety
Engineering
Data Safety
Property
Data Security Property: Conflict Conflict Resolution
Cabling compro-
mises the struc-
tural integrity of
the fuel tank.
Cabling will be
replaced with a
wireless solution.
Intended Desti-
nation/Usage
Confidentiality (Loss of confiden-
tiality): Data regarding the contents
of the fuel tank could be exposed.
1. Security risk assessment identifies that the risk
associated with the proposed design change is ac-
ceptable due to the encryption employed.
TABLE VII
CONFLICT RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVES IN SCENARIO 1
Alternative Security, Probability
of Adverse Event
Security, Impact Safety, Probability of
Adverse Event
Safety Impact
1: Do nothing High (Unauthorized,
unmonitored access)
High (Malicious trigger-
ing of [Function X])
Low Low
2: Require credentials Low Low High (Authorized
user denied access)
High (Unable to trigger [Func-
tion X] when required)
3: Fit room with physical lock Medium Medium Low Low
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